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Abstract. Since Fisher's formulation in 1922 of a framework for theoretical 
statistics, statistical theory has been concerned primarily with the deriva-
tion and properties of suitable statistical procedures on the basis of an 
assumed statistical model (including sensitivity to deviations from this 
model). Until relatively recently, the theory has paid little attention to the 
question of how such a model should be chosen. In the present paper, we 
consider first what Fisher and Neyman had to say about this problem and 
in Section 2 survey some contributions statistical theory has made to it. In 
Section 3 we study a distinction between two types of models (empirical 
and explanatory) which has been discussed by Neyman, Box, and others. A 
concluding section considers some lines of further work. 
Key words and phrases: Empirical model, explanatory model, model selec-
tion, reservoir of models, binomial model, technology, revolutionary and 
normal science. 
Where do probability models come from? To 
judge by the resounding silence over this question 
on the part of most statisticians, it seems highly 
embarrassing. In general, the theoretician is 
happy to accept that his abstract probability tri-
ple (!2, A, P) was found under a gooseberry bush, 
while the applied statistician's model "just 
growed". 
A. P . Dawid (1982) 
1. THE VIEWS OF FISHER AND NEYMAN 
A general framework for theoretical statistics was 
proposed by Fisher (1922) in his fundamental paper 
"On the mathematical foundations of theoretical sta-
tistics." In it, Fisher defines the principal task of 
statistics to be "the reduction of data," and states that 
"this object is accomplished by constructing a hypo-
thetical infinite population, of which the actual data 
are regarded as constituting a· sample. The law of 
distribution of this hypothetical population is speci-
fied by relatively few parameters, .. . . "In other words, 
Fisher states that the first step is the construction of 
a low-dimensional parametric model. 
On this basis, Fisher divides the problem of statis-
tics into three types: (1) problems of specification (that 
is, the problem of specifying the parametric model); 
(2) problems of estimation (this terminology for the 
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second stage is explained by the fact that Fisher in 
this paper is concerned only with point estimation; 
more generally, this type of problem could be described 
as the derivation of a suitable statistical procedure; 
and (3) problems of distribution (this refers to the 
distribution of the estimator derived in (2); a more 
general description of this last stage would be assess-
ing the performance of the procedure obtained in (2) ). 
The present paper is concerned only with the first 
of these stages, and it is with considerable interest 
that one wonders what Fisher has to say about it. 
Disappointingly, his discussion is confined to a single 
paragraph which is dominated by the first sentence: 
"As regards problems of specification, these are en-
tirely a matter for the practical statistician, .. .. " 
This statement constitutes Fisher's answer to the 
question raised in the heading of Section 2 of the 
present paper and the quotation at its beginning. 
Fisher's statement implies that in his view there can 
be no theory of modeling, no general modeling strat-
egies, but that instead each problem must be consid-
ered entirely on its own merits. He does not appear to 
have revised this opinion later; the index to the five-
volume collection of his papers (published by the 
University of Adelaide) has only one entry under 
"Specification, problems of'' -the 1922 statement 
cited in the preceding paragraph. 
Actually, following this uncompromisingly negative 
statement, Fisher unbends slightly and offers two 
general suggestions concerning model building: 
(a) "We must confine ourselves to those forms which 
we know how to handle," an (b) "More or less elab-
orate forms will be suitable according to the volume 
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of the data." We shall return to both of these sugges-
tions later. 
To Neyman, not only the practice but also the 
theory of modeling was a central concern. In 1959 he 
introduced a course in the subject into the Berkeley 
curriculum and taught it with few interruptions until 
the time of his death in 1981. We shall here discuss 
three comments of his on modeling. 
1. Models of complex phenomena are constructed 
by combining simple building blocks which, "partly 
through experience and partly through imagination, 
appear to us familiar, and, therefore, simple." Al-
though not making exactly the same point, this com-
ment is somewhat reminiscent of Fisher's suggestion 
that we should restrict attention to models we know 
how to handle. 
2. An important contribution to the theozy of mod-
eling is Neyman's distinction between two types of 
models: "interpolatory formulae" on the one hand and 
"explanatorY models" on the other. The latter try to 
provide an explanation of the mechanism underlying 
the observed phenomena; Mendelian inheritance was 
Neyman's favorite example. On the other hand an 
interpolatory formula is based on a convenient and 
flexible family of distributions or models given 
a priori, for example the Pearson curves, one of 
which is selected as providing the best fit to the data. 
(Neyman, 1939). The same distinction is emphasized 
in the writings of George Box, who uses the terms 
"empirical model" and "theoretical" or "mechanistic" 
model for the two concepts (mechanistic since it iden-
tifies the underlying mechanism) . 
3. The last comment of Neyman's we mention here 
is that to develop a "genuine explanatory theozy" 
requires substantial Knowledge of the scientific back-
ground of the problem. The same general idea is 
expressed by John Stuart Mill who writes in his Sys-
tem of Logic: "The guesses which serve to give mental 
unity and wholeness to a chaos of scattered particu-
lars, are accidents which rarely occur to any minds 
but those abounding in knowledge and disciplined in 
intellectual combinations" (Mill, 1879, page 344). This 
requirement is agreed on by all serious statisticians 
but it constitutes of course an obstacle to any general 
theory of modeling, and is likely a principal reason for 
Fisher's negative feeling concerning the possibility of 
such a theory. 
2. WHERE DO MODELS COME FROM? 
Several statisticians with extensive applied experi-
ence have objected to this question, stating that they 
know exactly where their models come from. However, 
it seems difficult to find explicit statements of how 
models are obtained, which raises the question in a 
different form: Is applied statistics, and more partic-
ularly model building, an art, with each new case 
having to be treated from scratch (although even 
artistic endeavors require techniques which can be 
systematized and learned), completely on its own mer-
its, or does theory have a contribution to make to this 
process? 
2. 1 A Reservoir of Models 
One crucial (although somewhat indirect) contri-
bution of theory is indicated by Fisher's and Neyman's 
reference to "those forms which we know how to 
handle," and to building blocks which "appear to us 
familiar and, therefore, simple." These references pre-
suppose the existence of a reservoir of models which 
are well understood and whose properties we know. 
Probability theory and statistics have provided us with 
a rich collection of such models. One need only think 
of the various families of univariate and multivariate 
distributions, of the different kinds of stochastic 
processes, of linear and generalized linear models, and 
so on. The list seems inexhaustible and furnishes the 
modeler with an indispensable tool. 
One aspect of models that is of particular impor-
tance to realistic modeling is the way they are de-
scribed or characterized. (For some references to the 
literature on characterization of distributions, see, for 
example, Galambos, 1982a.) 
ExAMPLE 2.1. As an illustration consider the model 
that is traditionally described by 
X~, . . . ,Xn. 
are iid with normal distribution N(O, u2). 
(2.1) 
If asked to justify the normality assumption, a statis-
tician might refer to the central limit theorem and for 
corroboration might cite previous experience with 
similar data. There is however an alternative approach 
which may be more convincing. The model (2.1) with 
n > 1 can be characterized by the two conditions 
(2.2a) the X's are independent 
and 
the joint density of the X's is spherically 
(2.2b) symmetric, i.e., the density is the same at 
all points equidistant from the origin. 
(For a discussion of the equivalence of (2.2) and (2.1) 
see, for example, Feller, 1966, pages 77-78, and Letac, 
1981.) 
The meaning of condition (2.2b) is much easier to 
grasp than that of normality. As an example, suppose 
that X, and X 2 are the coordinates of the impact of a 
shot fired at a circular target, where we shall assume 
that the expected point of impact is the hull's eye 
which is taken to be the origin. If the method of aiming 
is asymmetric in the horizontal and vertical directions 
(as is typically the case), the assumption of circular 
symmetry will usually not be justified; on the other 
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hand, one can imagine automated computer methods 
of aiming for which this symmetry does hold. 
ExAMPLE 2.2. As a second example, consider the 
assumption that a variable X is distributed according 
to an exponential distribution. This family of distri-
butions is characterized by the property of "no aging," 
i.e., the distribution of the lifetime remaining at time 
t (given that life has not terminated prior to t) is the 
same as the distribution of the lifetime X at birth. In 
many situations, this property clearly will not hold 
and an exponential distribution therefore be unsuita-
ble. Situations in which the assumption may be rea-
sonable are described for example in Mann, Schafer 
and Singpurwalla (1974). 
ExAMPLE 2.3. Consider finally the Poisson distri-
bution. In many applications, it arises as the distri-
bution of the number of events occurring in a fixed 
interval, where the events are generated by a Poisson 
process. The latter is characterized by two assump-
tions: (a) the numbers of events occurring in non-
overlapping intervals are independent, and (b) the 
probability of more than one event occurring in a very 
short interval is of smaller order than the probability 
of a single occurrence. 
Simple characterizations such as those of Examples 
2.1-2.3 not only provide relatively clear criteria for 
the applicability of a model in a given situation but 
they may also suggest, when the assumptions are not 
satisfied, in what way the assumptions are violated 
and on this basis lead to ideas as to how the model 
should be modified. For example, a Poisson model 
may not be suitable because of the presence of "mul-
tiple births," and this possibility can be incorporated 
into the model by specifying the distribution of the 
"litter size." (For a discussion of this idea from a 
modeling point of view, see, for example, Neyman and 
Scott, 1959, and Cox and Isham, 1980; some related 
ideas are considered by Feller, 1943.) 
An assumption that makes an appearance .in both 
Examples 2.1 and 2.3 and which generally enjoys great 
popularity is the assumption of independence. As has 
recently been emphasized by Kruskal (1988), this as-
sumption is often made rather casually. It is, for 
example, frequently taken for granted that successive 
observations by the same observer are independent. 
That this in fact tends not to be the case was noted 
by Pearson (1902) who carried out some experiments 
for this purpose. The issue is discussed by Student 
(1927) and Cochran (1968). Further references can be 
found in Kruskal's paper. Unfortunately, the inde-
pendence assumption is not only very seductive but 
the resulting references are liable to serious error when 
the assumption is not justified. 
Classes of models for dependent observations taken 
in series are treated in the theory of time series. 
Observations which, while not independent, retain the 
complete symmetry of the iid assumption are called 
exchangeable. The theory of exchangeable events was 
initiated by de Finetti; for references and recent de-
velopments, see, for example, Kingman (1978), Koch 
and Spizzichino (1981), Galambos (1982b) and 
Diaconis and Freedman (1984). 
2.2 Model Selection 
Procedures for choosing a model not from the vast 
storehouse mentioned in (2.1) but from a much more 
narrowly defined class of models are discussed in the 
theory of model selection. A typical example is the 
choice of a regression model, for example of the best 
dimension in a nested class of such models. The best 
fitting model is of course always the one that includes 
the largest number of variables. However, this diffi-
culty can be overcome in a number of ways, for ex-
ample by selecting the dimension k which minimizes 
the expected squared prediction error, i.e., the ex-
pected squared difference between the next observa-
tion and its best prediction from the model. 
This measure has two components: 
E(squared prediction error) 
(2.3) 
= (squared bias) + (variance). 
As the dimension k of the model increases, the bias 
will decrease. At the same time the variance will tend 
to increase since the need to estimate a larger number 
of parameters will increase the variability of the esti-
mator. Typically there will exist a minimizing value 
k0 which then provides the desired solution. The value 
of ko will tend to increase as the number of observa-
tions increases and its determination thus constitutes 
an implementation of Fisher's suggestion that "more 
or less elaborate forms will be suitable according to 
the volume of the data." (In practice, one minimizes 
not the expected squared prediction error which de-
pends on unknown parameters but a suitable esti-
mator of this expected value.) 
Areas in which model selection has been success-
fully employed include, besides regression (Breiman 
and Freedman, 1983), the choice of an appropriate 
ARMA model (Poskitt, 1987); choosing the order of a 
Markov chain (Katz, 1981); or the maximal order of 
the interactions to be included in factorial and log-
linear models (Linhart and Zucchini, 1986; Edwards 
and Havranek, 1987). 
As described above, this approach appears to make 
the choice of model automatically, solely on the basis 
of the data. However, this view of model selection 
ignores a preliminary step: the specification of the 
class of models from which the selection is to be made. 
This specification often will also be quite routine along 
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the line: we are modeling a smooth surface, so let's 
approximate it by a polynomial regression equation 
including all terms up to a given degree. In choosing 
the variables to include in the list of possibilities, we 
may be quite liberal and let the procedure make the 
choice from this list (as well as the degree of the 
polynomial) from tbe data. However, in other cases, 
the choice of class of models may be strongly informed 
by subject matter considerations. 
2.3 Modeling a Sequence of Dichotomous Trials 
The great difficulty of model specification is well 
illustrated by the history of models for sequences of 
dichotomous trials such as tosses with a coin, births 
classified by sex, defective and nondefective items on 
an assembly line, clinical trials or free throws in basket 
ball. 
In his 1710 paper, "An argument for divine provi-
dence, taken from the constant regularity observ'd in 
the births of both sexes," Arbuthnot assumed a bino-
mial distribution, and on this basis tested (and re-
jected) the hypothesis that p = '12. The binomial model 
of course is the result of two assumptions: (1) the 
constancy of the success probability p; and (2) the 
independence of the trials. Heyde and Seneta (1977) 
and Stigler (1986) discuss the history of the struggle 
with these assumptions which went on throughout the 
19th century, and which led to the development of 
more general alternative models and of tests of the 
binomial hypothesis. 
A curious debate sprang up in the early 20th cen-
tury in publications by Marbe (1899, 1916, 1919), 
Sterzinger (1911) and Kammerer (1919), in which 
these authors claimed that the results of probability 
theory contradict the-workings of the real world and 
are therefore not applicable to reality. These beliefs 
were based on their theories of the "bunching" of 
events (Kniiuelungstheorie) of Sterzinger, the "uni-
formity" (Gleichfiirmigkeit) of the world (Marbe) or 
Kammerer's principle of seriality, bolstered by incon-
sistencies which the authors thought they had discov-
ered between the observed numbers of runs in various 
dichotomous sequences such as coin tosses or births 
and the probabilities of such runs calculated on 
a binomial model. The arguments show that what 
is really being put in question is the assumption 
of independence. The flaws in some of this work 
are analyzed by Bortkiewicz (1917) and Czuber 
(1923). (For a recent study of related issues, see 
Gilovich, Vallone and Tversky, 1985; Tversky 
and Gilovich, 1989a, b; Larkey, Smith and Kadane, 
1989; and Hooker, 1989). 
3. TWO TYPES OF MODELS 
The distinction between the two types of models 
mentioned in Section 2, empirical (or interpolatory) 
on the one hand, and explanatory (or mechanistic) on 
the other, has been noted in one form or another by 
many writers and tends to make an appearance in 
most general discussions of modeling. Models of these 
two types differ in many respects and the distinction 
throws light on some aspects of the modeling process. 
3.1 Purpose 
As pointed out by Box (for example, in Box and 
Hunter, 1965, and Box and Draper, 1987) and others, 
the two kinds of models differ in their basic purpose. 
Empirical models are used as a guide to action, often 
based on forecasts of what to expect from future 
observations (e.g., the number of college applications, 
demand for goods, or stock market performance). 
In contrast, explanatory models embody the search 
for the basic mechanism underlying the process 
being studied; they constitute an effort to achieve 
understanding. 
The following description of the distinction is from 
a paper dealing with the role of models in ecology 
(Goldstein, 1977). 
Within a given ecological research program, 
modeling can be a valuable procedure in helping 
to address a number of frequently occurring re-
search objectives. A basic research objective is 
increased fundamental understanding of the sys-
tem being studied. This need not be an objective 
of all research programs. Oftentimes, there is a 
desire to produce a specific output from a given 
system. In many circumstances, this goal can be 
achieved through a well-designed manipulation of 
the system's inputs, without any attempt to derive 
a basic understanding as to how the system func-
tions. This type of approach is frequently referred 
to as an "input-output" analysis and the system 
is described as a "black box". Mathematical mod-
eling techniques can be very helpful in this type 
of analysis as well. 
3.2 Environment 
The two kinds of aims and attitudes described in 
3.1 tend to arise in somewhat different environments. 
This distinction is discussed for example in a paper 
by Healy (1978) who contrasts technology with sci-
ence, or applied with theoretical science, as follows: "I 
merely want to propose that much of what is com-
monly described as science comes more appropriately 
under the heading of technology. I could soften the 
blow . .. if I substituted for "technology" the term 
"applied science."" Asking what distinguishes the two, 
Healy goes on to state that: "I hold that, in contrast 
to the scientist, the technologist is not concerned with 
truth at all . .. . The mark of the technologist is that 
he must act; everything that he does has some sort of 
deadline. He has to manage therefore, with as much 
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truth as is available to him, with the scientific theories 
current in his time." 
It is interesting to contrast this with the following 
passage from Box and Hill (1967). 
It should be noted that the objective we are 
presently consid~ring is that of finding out 'how 
a system works'. The reason for this may be no 
more than scientific curiosity. However, if we 
know how the system works and can describe it 
by a mathematical model, then we can use this 
knowledge for practical aims such as predicting 
the behavior of the process under various experi-
mental conditions and, in particular, in finding 
optimum operating conditions. This fact leads to 
some confusion because if all we need to do is 
either to estimate the behavior of the process 
under various experimental conditions or to find 
optimum operating conditions, we do not neces-
sarily need a mechanistic model. In some circum-
stances, an attempt to discover a mechanism 
merely to develop an operable system would be 
needlessly time consuming. 
Both passages are somewhat defensive, but they 
defend against attacks from opposite directions. In 
the expectation that his audience will feel insulted by 
having their work described as technological rather 
than scientific, Healy says that he "could soften the 
blow" of calling what much of statistics is concerned 
with technology rather than science by using a less 
offensive terminology. Box and Hill, on the other 
hand, apologize for being needlessly scientific in a 
situation which calls for a solution to a practical 
problem. They point o.ut that developing an explana-
tory model rather than being satisfied with an empir-
ical one might be justified by more than mere 
"scientific curiosity": the knowledge gained in this 
way might actually be utilized "for practical aims." 
3.3 Ad Hoc Nature versus Broad Applicability 
The difference in attitudes just described leads quite 
naturally to different positions concerning the appro-
priate level of generality of the models and the conclu-
sion~ derived from them. A scientific model describing 
the structure of the underlying mechanism and the 
laws governing it will strive for the most general 
formulation possible. (A heated debate concerning the 
status of the logistic curve as a general law of popu-
lation growth is discussed in Kingsland, 1985.) This 
typically requires abstraction and idealization in order 
to eliminate the specific circumstances of particular 
situations. General physical laws explaining the mo-
tion of bodies or biological laws describing the genetic 
mechanisms of inheritance apply without regard to 
the nature of particular bodies and to very general 
classes of biological organisms. 
On the other hand, a technological model intended 
to provide guidance in a particular situation at hand 
will want to make full use of all the special circum-
stances of that situation. In particular, it needs to 
provide a good approximation only over the range of 
values of interest. Thus a linear regression may be 
perfectly adequate for the problem under considera-
tion even when it is clear that a linear approximation 
can provide a reasonable fit only over a very limited 
range. 
3.4 The Role of Subject MaHer 
An explanatory model, as is clear from the very 
nature of such models, requires detailed knowledge 
and understanding of the substantive situation that 
the model is to represent. On the other hand, an 
empirical model may be obtained from a family of 
models selected largely for convenience, on the basis 
solely of the data without much input from the under-
lying situation. (Examples of both situations can be 
found in the writings of Box and his coworkers, for 
example in Box and Hunter, 1965; Box and Hill, 1967; 
Box, Hunter and Hunter, 1978; and Box and Draper, 
1987.) 
It is interesting to examine Kepler's elliptical orbits 
and Mendel's laws of inheritance from this point of 
view. A first look at Kepler's work may lead to the 
conclusion that he just tried to fit a simple curve to 
the available data and found that an ellipse was both 
mathematically simple and provided an excellent fit . 
However, closer study reveals that his discovery came 
about as the result of a great deal of previous thinking 
and theorizing about the subject matter. (For a de-
tailed discussion of this point, see, for example, Aiton, 
1975, and Wilson, 1975.) 
Similarly it is tempting to believe that Mendel, often 
depicted as working in monastic isolation, came to his 
startling innovative laws solely by contemplating the 
results of his experiments with peas. Again it emerges 
. from a more detailed study that his conclusions and 
explanations were by no means based only on his data. 
(See, for example, Ore!, 1984, and Olby, 1985.) 
3.5 Validating the Model 
The difference in the aims and nature of the two 
types of models implies very different attitudes toward 
checking their validity. Techniques such as goodness 
of fit tests or cross validation serve the needs of 
checking an empirical model by determining whether 
the model provides an adequate fit for the data. Many 
different models could pass such a test, which reflects 
the fact that there is not a unique correct empirical 
model. On the other hand, ideally there is only one 
model which at the given level of abstraction and 
generality describes the mechanism or process in 
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question. To check its accuracy requires identification 
of the details of the model and their functions and 
interrelations with the corresponding details of the 
real situation. And the explanation must provide a 
detailed fit not only for the particular phenomenon at 
hand but must also fit appropriately into the existing 
scientific fabric of rlllated phenomena in which it is 
to become embedded. 
It is interesting to note that the distinction dis-
cussed in this section was realized, and considered 
important, long before the modern scientific age. Fol-
lowing are three quotes, one each from the 16th, 17th 
and 18th centuries, as given in Popper (1965). 
The first is from Osiander's "Preface to Copernicus' 
'De Revolutionibus"', putting a "spin" on this work of 
which Copernicus would hardly have approved had he 
lived to see it: "There is no need for these hypotheses 
to be true, or even to be at all like the truth; rather 
one thing is sufficient for them-that they should 
yield calculations which agree with the observations." 
For additional discussion of Osiander's Preface, 
the complete text of which is given for example in 
Rosen (1971), see Toulmin (1961) and particularly 
Blumenberg (1987). Note that throughout this paper 
it is tacitly assumed that there exists an underlying 
"true" situation which one is attempting to model. 
This is an attitude much discussed by philosophers of 
science. Some recent references are Cartwright (1983), 
Hacking (1983), Jardine (1986) and Giere (1988). 
Osiander was a Protestant Theologian. The issue 
became more heated in the following century in the 
dispute between Galileo and the Catholic Church. The 
position of the latter as stated by Cardinal Bellarmino 
in 1615 was that the church would raise no objections 
if Galileo stated his theory as a mathematical hypoth-
esis, "invented and assumed in order to abbreviate 
and ease the calculations," provided he did not claim 
it to be a true description of the world. 
As a last expression of this thought, here is a quote 
from Bishop Berkeley (1734). "A mathematical hy-
pothesis may be described as a procedure for calculat-
ing certain results. It is a mere formalism ... judged 
by its efficiency .... The question of truth of a math-
ematical hypothesis does not arise~only that of its 
use as. a calculating tool." Although these passages of 
course refer to deterministic rather than stochastic 
models, the idea of empirical modeling could hardly 
be expressed more clearly today. 
4. A SPECTRUM OF POSSIBILITIES 
The discussion in the preceding section of empirical 
and explanatory models ignores the fact that many, 
perhaps most, actual modeling situations have an 
intermediate character, exhibiting some features of 
each of the two types. This was clearly recognized by 
Kruskal and Neyman (1956) who wrote: 
Although the distinction between true theory 
and interpolation is sometimes quite sharp in 
specific cases, the two models of analysis really 
represent somewhat extreme points of a contin-
uous spectrum .... The continuum is by no means 
precise, nor is it meant to be so .... 
(The authors then proceed, as an amusing pastime, to 
place various kinds of models on a "fanciful scale" 
meant to represent this imprecise continuum. To fac-
tor analysis, for example, on a scale from 0 (pure 
interpolation) to 10 (fully explanatory) they assign a 
score of 4.) 
The corresponding remark applies to the discussion 
of science versus technology. In this connection, it is 
helpful to recall the distinction made by Kuhn (1970) 
between normal and revolutionary science. As sug-
gested by Neider (1986), normal science occupies a 
position somewhere between technology and revolu-
tionary science, and again there exists a whole spec-
trum of intermediate shadings. Concerning the role of 
statistics in these differents environments Neider 
writes: 
I doubt if statistics has much to offer to revolu-
tionary science .... The position is very different, 
however, with both normal science and technol-
ogy, though some justification may be needed for 
grouping them together here. I would argue that 
there are major differences between normal sci-
ence and technology, for example in the relevance 
of cost-benefit assessments to their progress, their 
long-term objectives, and their attitudes to theory 
(Healy, personal communication), it is nonethe-
less true that, on the scale of day to day activity, 
the procedures of (normal) scientist and technol-
ogist will be found to be very much alike. They 
will both be working within a given theoretical 
framework and be concerned, for instance, with 
estimating quantities defined within that frame-
work, with confirming the estimates of others, 
and with relating their estimates to those pre-
dicted by theory. 
The construction of a satisfactory "revolutionary" 
model is essentially the problem of scientific discov-
ery. Where the ideas for such discoveries come from 
is one of the central problems in the philosophy of 
science which has been discussed by many scientists 
and philosophers. Most scientists agree with Neider's 
implication that there can be no systematic aid to 
discovery, that it is a matter of imagination and in-
spiration. One of the most influential philosophers of 
science, Karl Popper, sums this up by saying (Popper, 
1965, page 192) that scientific hypotheses are "the free 
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creations of our own minds, the result of an almost 
poetic intuition." 
Yet even in this extreme case, the situation is not 
as clearcut as it seems at first . Examination of some 
of the classical examples of revolutionary science 
shows that the eventual explanatory model is often 
reached in stages, and that in the earlier efforts one 
may find models that are descriptive rather than fully 
explanatory. (Such descriptive models should perhaps 
be considered as a distinct third type intermediate 
between empirical and explanatory models. A division 
of models into these three types by Berkeley is dis-
cussed by Popper, 1965, page 169.) This is, for ex-
ample, true of Kepler whose descriptive model (laws) 
of planetary motion precede Newton's explanatory 
model. To some extent, this remark also applies to 
Mendel 's revolutionary model for inheritance. His 
theory does offer an explanation for his laws of seg-
regation and independent assortment in terms of fac-
tors responsible for the transmission of genetic 
material. However, he was not in a position to identify 
these factors and so obtain the required identification 
between his model and biological reality. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has been concerned with the question of 
what contribution statistical theory has to make to 
model specification or construction. Three areas of 
such contributions turned out to be the following. 
1. A reservoir of models. Here particular emphasis 
is placed on transparent characterizations or descrip-
tions of the models that would facilitate the under-
standing of when a given model is appropriate. (A 
special problem in this area which requires additional 
work is a study of the circumstances under which 
independence is or is not a suitable assumption.) 
2. Model selection. This is a body of techniques for 
selecting a particular model (or parametric subfamily 
of models) from a rather narrowly specified family of 
models. It seems likely that this approach will be 
developed much further, particularly with the help of 
techniques from artificial intelligence. The use of ex-
pert systems will make it easier to inject subject matter 
information into this process. On the other hand, it is 
difficult to see how this approach can break out of a 
current paradigm and thus lead to revolutionary sci-
entific discoveries. (An interesting and thoughtful 
"progress report" on the possible role of artificial 
intelligence in scientific discovery is provided by 
La1.gley, Simon, Bradshaw and Zytkow (1987). 
3. Classification of models. The distinction between 
explanatory and empirical models provides only one 
of the many ways in which models can be classified. 
A better understanding of the modeling process can 
perhaps be obtained by distinguishing various other 
types of situations which require different kinds of 
models. Fundamental differences between the needs 
and possibilities in the social and physical sciences, 
for example, are discussed by Lieberson (1985) and in 
the debates initiated by Freedman (1985, 1987). The 
corresponding issues regarding biology and physics 
(with extensive reference to the literature) are consid-
ered for example in Rosenberg (1985). 
.\nother important distinction is that between de-
terministic and stochastic models. Of course any sta-
tistical model has a stochastic component. This may, 
however, enter either only through the errors in the 
measurements of an essentially deterministic situa-
tion (as in Kepler's astronomical data) or also through 
the basic stochastic nature of the underlying phenom-
enon (for example, in Mendel's theory). 
As a last example, we mention the distinction be-
tween models which do or do not employ what psy-
chologists have called "hypothetical constructs" (see, 
for example, MacCorquodale and Meehl, 1948). These 
are entities whose existence is required by the theory 
but has not actually been established, although it is 
hoped that observation will eventually change their 
status. Mendel's genes or some of the elementary 
particles are cases in which eventual verification did 
occur; structures required for certain mental abilities, 
for example color vision, provide another illustration. 
On the other hand, the postulated existence of ether 
and phlogiston in the end had to be abandoned. 
In addition to these different types of models, it is 
useful to distinguish between two aspects, both of 
which are typically present in the- same model: the 
subject matter part of the model and the part played 
by "error." Here the latter term is meant to include 
not only measurement error but impurities in the 
material, changes in temperature or time of day, in 
fact all the contributions to the observations of the 
various environmental and observer effects that are 
extraneous to the subject matter. 
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